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Abstract
Futures traders are attracted to market liquidity—the ability to buy and
sell without the transaction having a large impact on market price. Market
liquidity is associated with a large number of buyers and sellers and high average
daily volumes of trading. This Article discusses the reluctance of futures traders
to switch to a new exchange which does not have as much liquidity as an older,
established exchange and the difficulty that these new exchanges face in acquiring
even a marginal portion of the market share. These difficulties arise because these
exchanges choose to use a clearing house that they own or control and they do not
list fungible products that can be offset at other exchanges. The Article further
suggests that this strategy protects the established exchanges from competition
from new exchanges.
I. Introduction
My first job after graduate school was designing new futures contracts for
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME” or, since 2007, “CME Group”). It was
not an uplifting job, because most of what we created—about eighty percent—
failed. But the process got me thinking about why some contracts succeed and
others fail. One basic rule I learned was that a sure way to fail was to create a
near clone of some product that was already actively traded at another exchange.
It was virtually impossible to capture market share from a product that had
already become successful at a competing exchange.
II. Liquidity Driven Monopolies in Futures Markets
Why? The market structure that has evolved in the futures industry has
resulted in each exchange having its own portfolio of monopoly products. On the
day that they merged in 2007, the CME had about seventy futures products and
the Chicago Board of Trade (“CBOT”) had about thirty-five products. Not a single
contract was actively traded at both exchanges. What is going on is simple.
*
This discussion was adapted from a powerpoint presentation, appendix A of this Article, by Professor
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Changing Legal and Compliance Landscape (Apr. 17, 2012).
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It is a process best described as “liquidity-driven monopoly.” One of the most
important things that futures traders want is market liquidity. They want to be
able to buy and sell without their transaction having much of an impact on market
price. It is not just having a narrow bid-ask spread, because that might exist only
for small transactions. Market liquidity is generally associated with lots of buyers
and sellers and high average daily volumes of trading. If an exchange has a liquid
market in some product and a second market is created in the same product at
another exchange, the imitator almost always fails. The new market cannot create
enough liquidity to attract traders away from the older liquid market.
Exchanges still try to capture market share from other exchanges. Since
2009, Electronic Liquidity Exchange Futures (“ELX Futures”) has competed
directly with CME Group by listing clones of its Treasury and Eurodollar
contracts, but ELX Futures’ volume has now shrunk almost to zero. NYSE Liffe
U.S. has launched a similar attack, but with some margining advantages that
have allowed it to reach between one percent and two percent market share so far.
But I never had high hopes for either imitator, or for the exchange called Broker
Tec that tried a similar failed attack on CBOT Treasury products back in 2000.
So it clearly pays to be first. This first-mover advantage is illustrated in a
few classic battles. Back during the magic period when financial innovations
totally rearranged the landscape of the once sleepy futures markets, the CME
launched a T-bill contract. It took other exchanges three years to realize what a
great product that was. But it was too late. It is apparent from the chart that the
New York Futures Exchange, COMEX and the American Commodity Exchange
never made a dent in CME’s T-bill business (see chart titled “Competition: T-bill
Futures, First Mover Wins” in Appendix A). The CME had such tremendous
liquidity, that it made no sense for traders and brokers to shift their trading to the
other markets.
In another competition, COMEX, the metals exchange listed silver futures
back in 1963. It traded very low volumes for four years, but when it started to take
off in 1967–68, it caught the attention of the world’s then-largest exchange, the
CBOT. And with their marketing power, the CBOT almost caught up with the
much smaller COMEX (see chart “Competition: Silver Futures, First Mover
Wins”). But after the silver bubble (created by the Hunt Brothers) collapsed in
1979, silver futures trading dropped significantly at both exchanges, but only
COMEX was able to bounce back.
So, what happens when a number of exchanges get the same idea at the
same time and there is no first mover? In 1974, Congress repealed the Gold
Reserve Act of 1934, making it possible again for Americans to own gold. On the
day the law went into effect, five exchanges listed gold contracts. And for three
years, COMEX and the CME were neck and neck (see chart “Gold Futures
Simultaneous Launches”). Then, in 1979, COMEX started pulling rapidly ahead
and CME began losing volume as traders moved from the less to the more liquid
market. Why did COMEX win? For our purposes it does not matter. The point is
that this is generally a winner-take-all game. But for the curious, the likely reason
is that COMEX was the long-time metals exchange with established distribution
channels and relationships in the metals community.
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In principle, if the exchange attacking the monopoly product of another
exchange offered some spectacular benefit, it could be sufficient to convince
traders to transfer their business to the new market. The only case in which I have
seen this happen is when an electronic exchange attacked a floor-based exchange.
And this has occurred during this fragile period when new electronic exchanges
were being launched and old, member-owned exchanges were reluctant to give up
their floors. The first of these was in 1998 when the electronic German exchange
known as Deutsche Terminborse (“DTB”) captured all trading in the German
Bund away from the London International Financial Futures Exchange (“LIFFE”).
The Bund had been the floor-based LIFFE’s most actively traded product and its
loss violated the liquidity driven monopoly principle and seriously frightened the
floor-based exchanges of the world.
The second case took place in 2006, when the all-electronic ICE Futures
Europe, 1 listed a clone of the New York Mercantile Exchange’s (“NYMEX”) huge
crude oil futures contract benchmark, West Texas Intermediate (“WTI”). 2 NYMEX
was an easy target. Not only was it very slow in developing its own electronic
system, it actually was moving in the other direction by opening floor-based energy
exchanges in Dublin and London. So, the industry was shocked to see ICE capture
a thirty percent market share in a matter of a few months. NYMEX saved itself
from losing its entire market share by striking a deal to use the CME’s Globex to
provide a quality electronic platform to NYMEX customers.
III. Why Are There Not Monopolies in Equity Options?
Why does this liquidity driven monopoly principle take hold in futures
markets but not in the huge market for exchange-traded equity options? It has
nothing to do with the fact that we are talking about two different types of
derivatives—futures and options. It has everything to do with regulation and
clearing. Exchange-traded futures, which were introduced about a century and a
half ago at the end of the Civil War, enjoyed a long early period virtually free of
federal regulation, until the enactment of the Grain Futures Act in 1922.
During the next fifty-two years of federal regulation, market oversight was
relatively light. The regulator was a small, relatively weak entity called the
Commodity Exchange Authority (“CEA”), which was buried within the very large
U.S. Department of Agriculture. In 1974, the law was strengthened and industry
oversight was given to an independent entity, called the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”). But one of the key features of the market structure
of futures trading was that each exchange had the right to have its own clearing
house or share a clearing house with other exchanges, whichever it wished. Even
when several exchanges shared a clearing house, each exchange had its own set of
independent contracts and did not make them fungible with one another. In other
words, a customer could not establish a position at one exchange and offset it at
another. A position could be offset only at the exchange on which the position was

1. ICE Futures Europe was known as the London-based International Petroleum Exchange (“IPE”)
before it was purchased by IntercontinentalExchange (“ICE”) in 2001.
2. It was not a total clone in that unlike the NYMEX physically delivered contract, ICE’s version was
cash settled. And to add insult to injury, it used NYMEX’s crude oil futures price as the basis for settlement.
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created. 3 This structure was the result of the organic evolution of the business,
with little regulatory interference.
In 1973, the members of the world’s largest futures exchange, the CBOT,
decided to create a totally new exchange to trade equity options. And because the
underlying asset was a security and because options were still banned on futures
exchanges, it had to be regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”), not the futures regulator. Initially, the CBOE intended to model itself on
its mother exchange, which had an independent, but slightly captive clearing
house called the Board of Trade Clearing Corporation (“BOTCC”). When other
SEC-regulated securities exchanges saw the CBOE’s success, they wanted to also
list options. While I do not know all the details, I suspect that the SEC decided to
apply the existing securities industry model for clearing and settlement to the new
options industry. So the SEC convinced the CBOE to spin its own clearing house
off into an industry utility serving all the new exchange traded equity options and
insisted that all options be identically structured and fungible. 4
This resulted in much more inter-exchange product competition than ever
existed in the futures industry. In futures, you get married to the exchange on
which you open a position (i.e., go long or short) because when you want to offset
it, you can only do it at that same exchange whose clearing house holds your
position. In the new options industry, you can be promiscuous, putting a position
on at whichever exchange offers you the best price, and offsetting the position
again at whichever exchange offers you the best price, because your position is not
held at the exchange, but at the common clearing house used by all exchanges.
What does that look like? 5 In March 2012, there were 3,554 different equity
options and exchange traded fund options listed at the nine different U.S. options
exchanges. For ninety percent of all these options, every one of the nine exchanges
had some market share. The average market share of the dominant exchange was
only twenty-nine percent. This is the polar opposite of futures exchanges, where
each exchange has a portfolio of monopoly products. And in cases where two or
more exchanges list the same product, as mentioned earlier in Treasuries and
Eurodollars, the dominant exchange has something closer to ninety-five percent
or ninety-eight percent market share. 6
While the first mover seems to have a clear advantage in futures
competitions, this does not seem to hold in equity options. There is one exception.
While the dominant product on options exchanges is the generic option on some
company’s stock, options on indexes typically involve a licensing agreement
whereby the index publisher grants an exclusive license to an exchange to list an
option based on the index. Whoever gets to the publisher first can lock up this
right for a number of years in a renewable contract. In those cases, the options
exchange does have 100% market share.
3. The only exception to this I can recall was in 1984 when the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”)
entered into an agreement with Singapore-based SIMEX to share a single fungible Eurodollar contract that
allowed customers to put a position on at SIMEX (today called SGX) and then transfer it to the CME’s clearing
house in Chicago, Illinois. Today, the relationship is two-way and includes five products.
4. This industry utility is known today as the Options Clearing Corporation (“OCC”).
5. Data in this paragraph came from the Market Data section of the OCC’s website. Market Data, OCC,
http://www.optionsclearing.com/market-data/.
6. See generally Michael Gorham & Poulomi Kundu, A Half Century of Product Innovation and
Competition at U.S. Futures Exchanges, 20 REV. OF FUTURES MARKETS 105 (July 2012).
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IV. Conclusion
U.S derivatives exchanges compete with one another for market share, but
the nature of that competition depends crucially on the clearing model used. When
given a choice, exchanges choose to use clearing houses that they own or control
and they do not list fungible products that can be offset at other exchanges. This
protects them from competition from these other exchanges. Because the futures
industry was unregulated during its first half century, it organically evolved along
these lines.
Only when imposed by a regulator, exchanges are forced to accept a clearing
arrangement that results in vigorous competition—this is what the SEC imposed
on the options industry from the beginning. The result is serious competitive
pressures on trading fees, something that happens at futures exchanges only
during rare competitive battles for products. In the early part of the last decade,
the broker-backed Futures Industry Association pushed the CFTC to impose an
SEC type system on the futures exchanges. Naturally this met with serious push
back on the part of the exchanges. And even the CFTC felt that it was
inappropriate for it to try to impose a new market structure on the futures
exchanges. I think it is unlikely that either Congress or the CFTC would push for
such a change in the foreseeable future.
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